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Disputes between riparian states over their shared freshwater resources are as
old as time and China and India have long been engaged in a race to exploit the
Brahmaputra. The Brahmaputra (also known as Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet or Jamuna
in Bangladesh) is the water richest river in the Himalaya and passes through China,
India, and Bangladesh before flowing into the Bay of Bengal. China has already built
more than a dozen dams on the Brahmaputra, with the biggest of them, the Zangmu
Hydropower Station, having reached full capacity in spring 2020. Similarly, India has
installed over 150 dams on the Brahmaputra since 1997.
Late last year, several networks (e.g. here, here and here) reported that China was
planning yet another mega hydropower station on the Brahmaputra in Tibet’s Medog
country as a part of its 14th Five-Year Plan. Although speculations about such a
project have been circulating for years, the recent reports sparked outrage and
fear in India and Bangladesh. In response, India considers building a dam on the
Brahmaputra itself to mitigate the negative impacts China’s hydropower station might
have. The losing party in this tug-of-war is Bangladesh. While China repeatedly
asserted that the interests of downstream states are taken into consideration, its
actions on inter alia the Mekong River suggest otherwise.
This blog will indicate the reasons why these newest proposals sparked international
controversy. Subsequently, it will turn to the question of whether China and India
have international obligations vis-à-vis Bangladesh regarding the utilization of the
Brahmaputra.
Why is damming the Brahmaputra a ground for concern?
A first ground for concern is the risk that damming the Brahmaputra escalates the
border dispute between China and India over the Indian-administered Arunachal
Pradesh region, through which the Brahmaputra runs. China expanded its military
presence and infrastructure construction in disputed areas of the Himalayas in recent
years and the new hydropower station is said to be planned in Medog country, a
region next to Arunachal Pradesh. China on the other hand fears India tightening its
control over Arunachal Pradesh by installing dams in the region.
A second ground for concern is China’s increasing ‘hydro-hegemony’, which leaves
downstream riparian states fearing China’s ability to control the amount of water
that arrives downstream and thus “turn off Asia’s tap”. Moreover, China and India
consider diverting the river to accommodate the needs of their water-scarce regions.
As much of the Brahmaputra’s waters come from Indian tributaries, India is not
entirely dependent on a steady water flow from China. By far the most vulnerable
to upstream river projects is Bangladesh. According to the UN Food and Agriculture
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Organization, Bangladesh’s dependency ratio on cross-boundary water flows is
91%, the Brahmaputra contributing nearly 70% of its annual river flow. China’s dams
on the Mekong River are leading by bad example, as they worsened droughts in
downstream countries and, at the same time, worsened flooding in the monsoon
season.
A third ground for concern are the negative environmental impacts of hydropower
stations for downstream riparian states. Hydropower stations affect the nutrient
content, sediment, and quality of the water, alter ecosystems and disrupt fish
migration (see e.g. here and here).
Between the Harmon Doctrine and territorial integrity: transboundary
watercourses under international water law
Shortly after the first media reports on the new mega-hydropower project,
a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed that “hydropower
development in the lower reaches of Yarlung Zangbo river is China’s legitimate
right”. On January 20th, 2021, a spokesperson for the Indian government said that
any attempt of China to set up a hydropower station on the Brahmaputra River will
constitute “an encroachment on the entitled rights of lower riparian states like India
and Bangladesh […].”
Both statements perfectly portray the diverging interests of upstream and
downstream riparian states of a shared watercourse resulting from their different
levels of control over the watercourse. Uppermost riparian states, such as China,
naturally claim what has come to be known as the ‘Harmon Doctrine’ (named after
US Attorney General Harmon who applied the idea to a dispute between the US
and Mexico over the polluting of the Rio Grande in 1895). According to the Harmon
Doctrine, riparian states have absolute territorial sovereignty over the watercourse,
including the right to utilize the waters regardless of the consequences for other
riparian states. Downstream riparian states, such as India and Bangladesh, claim a
right to territorial integrity, which in turn prohibits upstream riparian states to alter the
flow of an international watercourse (see e.g. here). Neither the Harmon Doctrine nor
the concept of an unlimited claim of territorial integrity prevailed in international water
law.
Nowadays, both interests are balanced through the (conventional) imposition of
some limitations on a state’s sovereign right to utilize its natural resources. In
this regard, the most important international treaties are the 1991 Convention
on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, the 1992
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, and the 1997 Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses
of International Watercourses (1997 Watercourses Convention). The 1997
Watercourses Convention provides for international cooperation through inter alia
the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization (Article 5) and the duty not
to cause significant transboundary harm (Article 7) and establishes a compulsory
dispute settlement regime with a fact-finding Commission (Article 33). Unfortunately,
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neither China nor India and Bangladesh have acceded to any of these Conventions
(cf. here, here, and here)
Which obligations do India and China have?
In contrast to South American states, who have equally rejected the 1997
Watercourses Convention but seem to have found a way of effectively and
cooperatively managing their shared freshwater resources through multilateral
agreements (e.g. on the Guarani Aquifer and the Amazon) and framework programs
(e.g. on the La Plata Basin), cooperation on the Brahmaputra is frighteningly under-
institutionalized. The only agreement in force on the Brahmaputra is a Memorandum
of Understanding between China and India, which – instead of regulating the
utilization or dispute settlement – merely encompasses an obligation of both states
to share hydrological data during the flood season.
However, even absent a formal treaty, the utilization of the Brahmaputra does not
take place in a legal vacuum. In its 1997 Gab#íkovo-Nagymaros Project Case,
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that riparian states have a “basic
right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an international
watercourse” (para. 78). The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, the
duty not to cause significant transboundary harm and the general obligation to
cooperate are established principles of customary international law (for an in-depth
analysis of the customary international law status see e.g. here and here) and, thus,
binding upon all states. According to the Commentary to Rule 10 of the 2004 Berlin
Rules, “there appears to have never been any dissent” to these “universally applied”
rules.
Despite voting against the adoption of the 1997 Watercourses Convention because
of inter alia its lack of affirmation of territorial sovereignty, China has endorsed the
primacy of the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization during its drafting
process. Several bilateral treaties between China and neighboring countries
encompass the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization as well as the
obligation not to cause significant transboundary harm. Similarly, India concluded
agreements in accordance with the abovementioned customary principles, for
example with Pakistan, Nepal, and, most notably, with Bangladesh on the sharing
of the Ganges waters. Further indicators of India’s and China’s commitment to
the obligation not to cause significant transboundary harm are their support of the
1972 Stockholm Declaration of the UN Conference on Human Environment, which
encompasses the obligation in Principle 21, as well as their accession to the 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity which, in Article 3, sets forth the duty not to
cause harm to neighboring states. During the 1992 UN Conference on Environment
and Development China stated that “no country should tap and exploit its natural
resources to the detriment […] of other countries” (p. 36). More recently, in July
2020, China held that the “utilization of cross-border water resources must take into
account the combined interests of upstream and downstream countries.” Hence,
neither China nor India could claim a position of persistent objectors in order to not
be bound by the customary rules.
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Problematically, absent any specific agreement or joint management body, the
content of the customary obligations is difficult to be determined, since equitable and
reasonable utilization as well as significant harm may be understood differently by
the states. Accordingly, for both substantive principles to be implemented effectively,
compliance with the procedural duty to cooperate is indispensable. Due to the
mistrust between all three riparian states, the establishment of a cooperative water
management and sharing regime for the Brahmaputra does not seem likely in the
near future.
What can Bangladesh do?
Although China and India must adhere to the principle of equitable and reasonable
utilization and the obligation not to cause significant transboundary harm in
their utilization of the Brahmaputra, Bangladesh has limited options to enforce
compliance. Absent any formal agreement on the Brahmaputra and ratification of
the 1997 Watercourses Convention with its compulsory dispute settlement regime,
voluntary dispute settlement determining the scope of the duties and enforcing
compliance is highly unlikely.
What has been proposed is to “lend teeth” to the international water law regime
by enforcing compliance through investment treaty arbitration. As Bangladesh has
bilateral investment treaties with India and China, the assessment of this proposal for
Bangladesh’s case might be worthwhile.
The most effective way for Bangladesh to be heard may be to appeal to the
international community to find more powerful advocates for its case. As legal
action against China or India is rather futile, Bangladesh could call on the General
Assembly to request an Advisory Opinion by the ICJ on the legal consequences
of China’s and India’s damming of the Brahmaputra according to Article 96(1) UN
Charter.
Ultimately, however, none of these measures is too promising, as the scope of
any investment dispute on the matter will be limited, whereas a potential Advisory
Opinion by the ICJ will not be binding. The only long-term solution is a trilateral treaty
with the establishment of a formal body for its implementation – similar to the Indus
Basin Organization or the Mekong River Commission. However, due to the disputes
between the states, this will be a diplomatic mammoth task.
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